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The policy of the European Union aimed at reconciling the stabilization dimension with 
the prospective integration of the states of the Western Balkans seems to have produced few 
results in recent years. In this paper the authors attempt to provide an account of the short 
historical period in which the EU developed a coherent regional policy towards the Balkans for 
the first time. This policy, called a ‗Regional Approach‘, was designed by the EU‘s institutions 
for the region in late 1995 and was pursued until the Kosovo crisis of 1999. This policy placed a 
paramount emphasis on the stabilization of the region during a post-conflict period. The analysis 
in this paper is centered on the questions of the scope of states covered by the ‗Regional 
Approach‘ policy, its objectives, the principle of conditionality it employed and the reasons for 
its limited success. The argument contributes to the wider debate about the features of the EU‘s 
policy designed for the stabilization and integration of the Western Balkans. The paper also 
attempts to identify the points in which the ‗Regional Approach‘ departs from the usual features 
of the EU‘s regional policies. In particular, comparisons are made with the EU‘s policy toward 
the region of Eastern and Central Europe, developing at the same period of time as the ‗Regional 
Approach‘. In addition, the paper also contributes to the general discussion about the modalities 
of the EU‘s regional policies. 
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Almost fifteen years have passed since the European Council in Santa Maria de Feira famously 
declared that all the countries of the Western Balkans were ―potential candidates for EU 
membership‖ (Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira, 2000, para. 67) At the present 
time, however, few observers would claim that the EU‘s Stabilization and Association Process 
and the policy of enlargement for the states of the Western Balkans launched in the wake of the 
Kosovo crisis in 1999 have been a success story (Blockmans 2007: 207–220; Phinnemore 2003: 
77–103; Drouet 2007: 147–169; Ott and Inglis 2002: 165–174; Friis and Murphy 2000: 767–
786). The reasons for the limited success of the EU‘s bold visions for the stabilization and 
European integration of its neighbouring south-eastern region form a complex problematic. In 
this paper we will attempt to contribute to the wider debate about the features of the European 
Union‘s policy designed for the stabilization and integration of the Western Balkans. More 
concretely, we focus on the ‗Regional Approach‘ policy designed by the European Union‘s 
Institutions toward the region of the Western Balkans in late 1995 and pursued until the Kosovo 
crisis of 1999. The analysis of the elements of the ‗Regional Approach‘ facilitates evaluation of 
the subsequently developed policy of the Stabilization and Association Process, which actually 
preserved many of the features outlined in the pre-1999 period. The analysis also contributes to 
the wider discussion on the modalities of the EU‘s regional policies, in particular with regard to 
the policy developed toward the states of Central and Eastern Europe in the same period.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first section provides an overview of 
developments occurring before the ‗Regional Approach‘ was designed in late 1995, in order to 
explain the emergence of this major shift in EU policy. In the second section, the ‗Regional 
Approach‘ is analyzed, in particular with regard to the scope of states covered by this policy, its 
objectives, the principle of conditionality it outlined and the instruments it employed. The last 
section provides a few concluding remarks on the ‗Regional Approach‘, the reasons for its 
limited success and its influence on subsequent developments in relations between the European 
Union and the states of the region. 
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The European Union’s policy toward Yugoslavia and its successor states in the 
period until 1996  
In order to evaluate the emergence of the ‗Regional Approach‘ policy, in this section we 
will briefly consider two issues: firstly, we will overview the relations between Yugoslavia and 
the European Union in the decades before the dissolution of the former state. Secondly, we will 
outline the developments of relations between the European Union and the Yugoslav successor 
states.  
The beginnings of the European Economic Community‘s policy toward Yugoslavia date 
back to the period of the Cold War. As is well known, at that time the political situation in 
divided Europe posed great challenges. The states of Eastern Europe were grouped in the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) or COMECON (Gjurcilova 2005: 14–71) 
and, among the communist states, Yugoslavia was the only one not strictly tied to the Soviet 
Union, instead pursuing a specific ‗non-aligned policy‘. For geostrategic reasons it was 
important for the European Economic Community to maintain as good relations as possible with 
Yugoslavia. And Yugoslavia also had reasons to ensure its relations with the EEC were as good 
as possible. Namely, the fact that Yugoslavia shared borders with several communist states made 
its geographical position awkward. In addition, despite continuous reforms and efforts to develop 
its ‗self-management economy‘, the economic development of Yugoslavia was rather weak. 
Thus the relationship with the European Union was important for this state both geostrategically 
and economically (Ramet and Adamovich 1995; Holmes 1990). 
Yugoslavia recognized the international legal personality of the European Economic 
Community and diplomatic relations were established: both parties exchanged Permanent 
Missions as early as 1968, and Yugoslavia signed its first non-preferential three-year trade 
agreement with the European Economic Community in 1970 (JO 1970 L 58/2; OJ 1973 L 
224/2). In 1980, a Cooperation Agreement was signed (OJ 1980 L130/2; OJ 1983 L41/2). 
Financial assistance to advance Yugoslavia‘s economic development was also envisaged. In later 
years, the conclusion of an Association Agreement was considered and, from 1990, Yugoslavia 
was included in the PHARE programme for assistance (OJ 1990 L 257; Gjurcilova 2005: 71–
84). Regrettably, the violent events that later broke out in Yugoslavia led the Council to decide to 
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denounce the existing Cooperation Agreement and its other forms of economic cooperation with 
Yugoslavia (OJ 1991 L 325/23). The states emerging from former Yugoslavia were drawn into a 
series of military crises and, in spite of the advanced relationship that Yugoslavia had enjoyed 
with the EU in previous decades, these military developments caused a long-lasting deterioration 
in the relations between these states and the European Union. Therefore, the privileged status 
was lost. The standing of the newly-formed states that emerged from Yugoslavia in the 
negotiating of the contractual relations with the European Union was much lower. 
With the rapid deterioration of the Soviet Union‘s power, the former member-states of 
COMECON found themselves in a completely new position. A rhetoric of ―re-uniting Europe‖ 
began to emerge, leading to previously unthought-of geostrategic changes and a gradual but 
steady strengthening of relations between these former COMECON states and the European 
Union (Dinan 2006: 253–292) In this way, major discrepancies appeared in the attitudes adopted 
by the European Union towards each of these regions. While the former COMECON states were 
steadily sliding into accession to the European Union, the post-Yugoslav states were accorded a 
series of stabilization initiatives. Interestingly, not all post-Yugoslav states received the same 
treatment from the European Union. Slovenia was the only state among the Yugoslav successors 
that escaped the stabilization phase. First it concluded a Cooperation Agreement with the 
European Union and later a ‗Europe‘ Agreement, therefore managing to slide into the EU 
accession process (OJ 1993 L 189; OJ 1999 L 51). The other successor states—Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—underwent prolonged military 
conflicts. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was dissolved into the separate states of 
Montenegro and Serbia (2006), as well as Kosovo (which declared independence in 2008). 
Macedonia avoided military conflict before a brief violent episode broke out between 
government forces and ethnic Albanian rebels in 2001. Until that period, Macedonia had been 
peaceful, as had the neighbouring state of Albania which signed a cooperation agreement with 
the European Union in 1992 (OJ 1992 L 343/1). 
From the beginning of the 1990s, therefore, it became a matter of great importance for 
the European Union to ensure stabilization of the conflicts emerging one after another in its 
neighbouring region. The stabilization initiatives employed with regard to the former Yugoslav 
states gained proportions that cannot be compared with anything happening in Central and 
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Eastern European countries in the same period of time. Namely, in the latter region, stabilization 
normally meant strengthening reforms leading to democratic and economic development 
(Tatham 2009: 71–116). In the Balkans, after the very beginning when the European Union had 
made efforts to preserve Yugoslavia, the policy turned toward incentives for solving military 
developments and, later on, reconstruction. In addition, the European Union‘s policy toward the 
Western Balkans was directed, as Tatham puts it, ―rather to State-building than State-
consolidation‖, even when compared to the European Union‘s enlargement toward the East 
(Tatham 2009: 160).    
 
The ‘Regional Approach’ 
 
We proceed in this section to an analysis of the European Union‘s ‗Regional Approach‘ 
policy, especially with regard to the historical context of its emergence, the scope of states it 
covered, its objectives, the principle of conditionality and the instruments it employed. 
Only when the Dayton Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did the 
European Union develop ―a more coherent and comprehensive approach to its Balkan policy by 
adopting the 'Regional Approach' to co-operation with the states in the western Balkans…‖ 
(Kramer 2000: 3). Namely, during the latter part of 1995, several international actors, including 
the European Union, launched the ‗Royaumont Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness 
in South-East Europe‘ to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and 
democratization of the region (Bull. EU 1/2 -1996, point 1.4.108.). In parallel with this initiative, 
the European Union launched its own ‗Regional Approach‘ policy.  
At that period of time, the ‗Regional Approach‘ was a step forward in the European 
Union‘s policy toward the post-Yugoslav states. Firstly, during the military crisis in former 
Yugoslavia, there had been huge differences among the foreign policy objectives of different 
European Union Member States. Secondly, the European Union itself had also pursued the line 
of bilateral approach toward each of these states (Giansily 1999; Blockmans 2007: 111–175). 
Therefore the multilateralism ensured by the ‗Regional Approach‘ was considered an important 
transformation that would, after many failures, finally lead to the stabilization of a turbulent 
region.   
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However, the emergence of the European Union‘s first regional policy toward this area 
obtained a somewhat confusing scope. As it was envisaged in 1995, this policy was supposed to 
bring about the stabilization of the states involved in military conflict (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and the FRY of Serbia and Montenegro). Although Macedonia was not among these 
states, the fact that it was covered by the ‗Regional Approach‘ was evidently due to the fact that 
it was one of the Yugoslav successor states. However, in early 1996, the Council noted that the 
‗Regional Approach‘ had been widened and that it ―… should be directed primarily at those 
countries of the region for which the European Community has not adopted directives for the 
negotiation of association agreements. Neighbouring countries which so wish should be able to 
be associated in the cooperation by appropriate means‖ (Council Conclusions and Declaration on 
former Yugoslavia, Bull. EU 1/2 – 1996, point 1.4.108.). Therefore Albania was included in this 
group of post-Yugoslav states that became targets of the ‗Regional Approach‘. As mentioned 
before, another Yugoslav successor state, Slovenia, was already sliding toward accession to the 
European Union, joining the group of Central and Eastern European States, which was in a much 
more advantageous situation vis-à-vis the European Union. Romania and Bulgaria, two 
neighbouring Balkan states that had formerly belonged to COMECON and which had a very low 
level of economic development, were also involved in this privileged group of Central and 
Eastern European states. Namely, at the time of the emergence of the ‗Regional Approach‘, these 
two states had already signed not only cooperation agreements but also ‗Europe‘ Agreements 
with the European Union (OJ 1990 L 291; OJ 1994 L 358; OJ 1991 L 79; OJ 1994 L 357). The 
new approach covered neither the entire post-communist Balkans nor its entire western part, and 
it remained unclear which criteria were being followed when determining the scope of states 
covered by the ‗Regional Approach‘. Nevertheless, the ‗Regional Approach‘, as introduced in 
late 1995 and early 1996, marked the emergence of the political construct later called the 
Western Balkans. In subsequent years, the European Union continued to pursue a separate 
regional policy towards the Western Balkans, albeit with a somewhat changed scope of covered 
states, since, after pursuing successful accession negotiations, Croatia managed to access the 
European Union in 2013.  
The ‗Regional Approach‘ (as was later the case with the Stabilization and Association 
Process) was conceptualized by the Commission (Bull EU 9-1995 point 1.4.40), and in late 1995 
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the Council Conclusions on guidelines for former Yugoslavia confirmed that they envisaged 
―…a long-term relationship with the countries of the region‖ (Bull EU 10-1995 point 2.2.1.) 
which ―should take the form of agreements in the framework of a regional approach‘‘ (Bull EU 
10-1995 point 2.2.1.). These agreements were to fulfil several objectives: the improvement and 
intensification of relations with the European Union, taking into account, as far as possible, the 
aspirations of the countries concerned; the fostering of reconciliation and the establishment of 
open and cooperative relations among these countries and their closest neighbours and an overall 
contribution of the European Union to peace and stability in the region (Bull EU 10-1995 point 
2.2.1.). According to the General Affairs Council of 26 February 1996: ―the agreements with 
each of the countries concerned must be designed as a substantial incentive to political stability 
and as an instrument for economic development and cooperation between them, between those 
countries and their neighbours, and with the European Union.‖ (Bull. EU 1/2 – 1996 point 
1.4.108.) 
The elements of this strategy mainly followed the usual foreign policy choices of the 
European Union. Karen Smith has pointed out that: ―The EU prefers to deal with third countries 
collectively: it lays out regional strategies, sets up aid programmes on a regional basis, and 
concludes specific kinds of agreements with countries in a particular region.‘‘(Smith 2008: 69) 
The same author explains that in order to achieve regional cooperation, the European Union 
relies on two practices: classifying neighbouring countries together under regional strategies and 
encouraging regional groupings (Smith 2008: 69). What was particular in the case of the 
‗Regional Approach‘, as we have seen above, was the huge emphasis on post-conflict 
stabilization.  
As is usually the case with the European Union‘s regional policies, the ‗Regional 
Approach‘ involved multiple policy instruments, such as financial assistance, unilateral trade 
preferences and cooperation agreements (Bull. EU 1/2 – 1996 point 1.4.108.). At that time, 
cooperation agreements had already been concluded with numerous Central and Eastern 
European states and these are unofficially known as first-generation agreements. This 
designation points to the fact that the European Union gradually replaced these cooperation 
agreements, previously signed with each of the Central and Eastern European states, with 
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Association Agreements (or ‗Europe‘ Agreements) which were considered to lead directly to 
accession to the European Union (Ott 2002: 349–368).  
Apart from the emphasis on stabilization as its paramount objective, the feature in which 
the ‗Regional Approach‘ departs from the usual pattern of the European Union‘s regional 
policies is the profile of the principle of conditionality it employed. Thus it has been noted that, 
compared to the European Union‘s other regional policies, this conditionality differed because it 
was ―elaborated, concrete and contained a list of conditions whose fulfilment would bring certain 
results‖ (Beshirevic and Cujzek 2013: 161). 
Already in late 1995 it was stated that ―(t)he agreements (…) should have an element of 
clear political and economic conditionality‘‘ (Bull EU 10-1995, point 2.2.1.) and that regional 
cooperation was to be observed in particular. Other envisaged conditions included respect for 
human rights, minority rights, the right to return of displaced persons and refugees, democratic 
institutions, political and economic reforms, readiness to establish open and cooperative relations 
between these countries, full compliance with the terms of the peace agreement, and, with regard 
to the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), the granting of a large degree of autonomy within it to 
Kosovo (Bull EU 10-1995, point 2.2.1.). In its Conclusions, the General Affairs Council of 26 
February 1996 outlined further requirements for the concerned states, such as adopting reciprocal 
measures, particularly regarding the free movement of goods and persons, and the provision of 
services and development of projects of common interest. Through this regional approach, 
financial aid from the European Union could be oriented towards jointly defined and cross-
border projects (Bull EU 1/2 – 1996, point 1.4.108.). In addition, non-compliance was to be 
sanctioned by ‗specific measures‘ (Bull. EU 1/2 – 1996, point 1.4.108.).   
The emphasis on regional cooperation has always been at the core of the European 
Union‘s regional policies. In the last enlargement round, the requirement for regional 
cooperation was included in the EU‘s policy toward the ‗Visegrad‘ states. In 1994, the Essen 
European Council promoted good-neighbourly relations and ―intra-regional cooperation between 
the associated countries themselves and their immediate neighbours‖ as an important element of 
the principle of conditionality. However, in the case of the ‗Regional Approach‘ this objective 
gained the form of a legal condition introduced in the concluded agreements, as can be seen, for 
example, in the Cooperation Agreement signed with Macedonia (Lopardic 1998: 326.). 
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The emphasis placed in the ‗Regional Approach‘ on different aspects of human rights is 
also evident. Namely, the observance of human rights has, for a long time, been an important 
feature of the European Union‘s external relations, even in cases when they were centered on 
purely economic issues (Bartels 2005: 5–78). The conditions connected to human rights in the 
case of the ‗Regional Approach‘ had a much more elaborated content, which is not surprising 
given the overall objective of the stabilization of this region. 
The document named ‗Conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing the 
development of the European Union‘s relations with certain countries of south-east Europe‘, 
produced by the Council on April 29, 1997, was the document that largely clarified the 
conditionality principle applied to the Western Balkans. According to the General Affairs 
Council: ―… the EU has agreed to establish, in the framework of the regional approach, political 
and economic conditions as the basis for a coherent and transparent policy towards the 
development of bilateral relations in the fields of trade, of financial assistance and economic 
cooperation as well as of contractual relations, allowing for the necessary degree of flexibility. 
The EU strategy should serve as an incentive, and not an obstacle, to the countries concerned to 
fulfil these conditions.‖ (General Affairs Council. See: Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1.) 
The document contains an introduction and subheadings such as ‗EU strategy on 
conditionality‘, ‗Graduated Approach‘, ‗Schedule for the application of conditions to different 
levels of relations and cooperation‘ (including Autonomous Trade Preferences, PHARE: 
implementation of the programme, Contractual Relations, and an Annex listing the elements for 
assessing compliance) (Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1.). The listed elements were as follows: 
1. Democratic principles (Representative government, accountable executive; 
Government and public authorities to act in a manner consistent with the constitution and the 
law; Separation of powers (government, administration, judiciary); Free and fair elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot). 
2. Human rights, rule of law (Freedom of expression, including independent media; Right 
of assembly and demonstration; Right of association; Right to privacy, family, home and 
correspondence; Right to property; Effective means of redress against administrative decisions; 
Access to courts and right to fair trial; Equality before the law and equal protection by the law; 
Freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment and arbitrary arrest). 
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3. Respect for and protection of minorities (Right to establish and maintain their own 
educational, cultural and religious institutions, organisations or associations; Adequate 
opportunities for these minorities to use their own language before courts and public authorities; 
Adequate protection of refugees and displaced persons returning to areas where they represent an 
ethnic minority). 
4. Market economy reform (Macroeconomic institutions and policies necessary to ensure 
a stable economic environment; Comprehensive liberalisation of prices, trade and current 
payments; Setting up of a transparent and stable legal and regulatory framework; 
Demonopolisation and privatisation of state-owned or socially owned enterprises; Establishment 
of a competitive and prudently managed banking sector) (Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1.). 
It is evident that the content of the conditionality principle strongly resembles the famous 
Copenhagen criteria designed to guide the pre-accession strategy for Central and Eastern 
European countries. However, it is also evident that the above conditionality framework actually 
broadens the content of the Copenhagen criteria. In addition, despite this similarity, the principle 
of conditionality, as envisaged in the framework of the ‗Regional Approach‘, is not designed to 
promote the full European integration of the states in the region.   
Interestingly, the above document includes both the conditions applicable for the entire 
region and those applicable only for a certain state. The coherence of the approach was essential 
for the development of a truly regional strategy. This was even more important given the 
differences between individual Member States with regard to the Yugoslav conflict in the early 
1990s. Further, the multilateral approach was to be reconciled with the establishment of bilateral 
relations with each of the concerned states, including separate conditions for each of them 
(Beshirevic and Cujzek2013: 162). Some observers, however, point out that the regional 
approach and the principle of conditionality are incompatible because they rival each other 
(Wichmann 2004). We may recall that the European Union‘s experience in this sense was 
equally discouraging during the eastern enlargement. Namely, in that case, the European Union 
tried to balance the bilateral approach in relations to Central and Eastern European countries with 
the multilateral approach (‗structured relationship‘). However, this strategy was soon to be 
abandoned and the European Union proceeded with bilateral negotiations with each of the 
concerned states, leading toward accession. 
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Another feature of the European Union‘s strategy of conditionality is its reliance on a 
gradual approach: trade preferences, financial assistance and the establishment of contractual 
relations would be assured for states that fulfilled certain conditions. The beginning of the 
negotiations was supposed to require a lower level of compliance than that required for the 
conclusion of an agreement (Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1.). Besides rewarding states with more 
intense bilateral relations in return for fulfilling the conditions, any refusal to fulfil the conditions 
might result in the withdrawal of advantages and suspension of the agreement (Pippan 2004: 
219–245; Blockmans 2007: 241–307; Tatham 2009: 159–173). Importantly, the criteria set by 
the 1997 Conclusions of the General Affairs Council were supposedto be used by the 
Commission in evaluations of compliance with the economic and political conditionality of the 
concerned states. In that way the ‗Regional Approach‘ ‗mirrored‘ the ‗Pre-Accession Process‘, 
developed at the same time for official candidates from Eastern Europe for membership in the 
European Union (Vachudova 2003: 147). 
The instruments employed by the ‗Regional Approach‘, as Lopardic points out (Lopardic 
1998: 327–328), might take a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral form. Typical unilateral 
instruments were the autonomous commercial measures like those applied for post-Yugoslav 
states (Regulation (EC) 70/97, OJ 1997 L 16; Regulation (EC) 825/97, OJ 1997 L 119). Most of 
the financial aid belonged to this group, such as that for the reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Renauld 1997: 445–9) and the aid channelled through the PHARE programme. For 
example, on 25 July, 1996, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1628/96 (named 
‗‘OBNOVA‖) on financial assistance for the former-Yugoslav states of Croatia, the FRY, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (OJ 1996 L 204). Interestingly, unlike in the case of 
PHARE, this Regulation envisaged conditionality. According to Article 2: ―This Regulation is 
based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, which are an essential aspect. The specific conditions laid down by the 
Council for the implementation of cooperation with former Yugoslavia are also an essential part 
of this Regulation.‖(OJ 1996 L 204/1). Therefore, financial assistance to the recipient states was 
linked to the observance of strict conditionality, including ―an essential element clause‖. The 
bilateral form of instruments was typical for the cooperation agreements that included both a 
political dialogue and a financial protocol, also permitting crediting from the BEI. Multilateral 
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cooperation was a novelty introduced by the ‗Regional Approach‘ (Lopardic 1998: 328). In that 
sense, the Commission has placed a particular emphasis on regional political dialogue as a result 
of linking bilateral and multilateral cooperation. As the Commission explained, political dialogue 
was considered ―an appropriate instrument‖ for promoting human and minority rights and 
democratic principles (COM (96) 476 final: 7.). 
It should be recalled, however, that there were already at the time several multilateral 
initiatives designed for the region, a circumstance which is believed to have contributed to their 
limited success. As mentioned before, the Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness in 
South-East Europe was a multilateral project aimed to support the implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement. In addition, according to the Council Conclusions, this process aimed toward 
improving dialogue and confidence, regional cooperation and economic reconstruction (Bull. EU 
½-1996, point 1.4.108; Meurs 2001: 72-91; Unal 1998: 2). Apart from this major initiative, there 
were others, such as the US-led ‗South-East European Cooperation Initiative‘, ‗The Central 
European Initiative‘, ‗The Process on Stability and Good-Neighbourliness in South-East Europe‘ 
and ‗The South-East European Cooperation Process‘.  
Nevertheless, the states from the region did not accept the carrot provided by the 
‗Regional Approach‘. For example, Albania and Macedonia considered the ‗Regional Approach‘ 
to be a step backwards in their relations with the European Union (Fakiola and Tzifakis 2008: 
381), probably based on the fact that they had not participated in the military conflicts of the 
1990s. The other states covered by the ‗Regional Approach‘, such as Croatia, also had 
grievances about the European Union‘s insistence on regional cooperation and they felt it was a 
policy which kept them away from Europe (Mileta 1997: 24–30). It has also been pointed out 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia suspected that the European Union was attempting to 
reconstitute former Yugoslavia in some way. Therefore, it was only Macedonia which managed 
to conclude a cooperation agreement with the European Union (OJ 1997 L348/2). The other state 
which had a cooperation agreement with the European Union was Albania, but this agreement 
dated from before 1996, having been concluded in 1992 (OJ 1992 L343/1). 
Although it has been noted that initiatives leading to regional cooperation have ―the best 
potential of reducing the inclusion-exclusion problem‖ (Cremona 2003: 125) arising from 
enlargement, it seems that the carrot of regional cooperation has been, in both Eastern Europe 
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and in the Balkans, strictly centered around the European Union. It is this lack of a clear vision 
of integration which produced the failure of the ‗Regional Approach‘. Therefore, unsurprisingly, 
in 1999 the Commission proposed a policy shift: ―The multiplicity of initiatives in the Western 
Balkans has created confusion. It has also diluted the influence of the EU in the region. As a first 
step the EU should work, through the Stability Pact, to streamline and focus the maximum 
international effort.‖(EU Commission, Composite Paper, Reports on progress towards accession 
by each of the candidate countries, 1999: 37) This meant that the ‗Regional Approach‘ was 
deemed insufficient and, soon afterwards, the Council began to issue a series of proclamations on 
the European integration of the states of the Western Balkans (Common Position 
1999/345/CFSP, preamble, recital 7. OJ 1999 L 133/1; Presidency Conclusions, European 
Council, Lisbon, 23–24 March 2000, paragraph. 47; Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 
Santa Maria da Feira, 19–20 June, 2000, paragraph 67; Annex A to Council Conclusions of June 
16 2003, Press Release No 10369/03 (Presse 166)). 
 
Conclusion 
Analysis of the profile of the ‗Regional Approach‘ reveals that many of its features do 
not depart from the regular patterns of the European Union‘s regional policies. In many points, 
this policy built on recent experience with regard to Central and Eastern Europe. Its main 
original element was its objective of stabilization, to be achieved through emphasized regional 
cooperation. Yet it is evident that, despite all efforts and initiatives, regional cooperation among 
the states of the Western Balkans was limited throughout the period 1996–1999, revealing the 
inefficiency of the multilateral dimension of the ‗Regional Approach‘. On the other hand, the 
bilateral dimension—i.e. the relations between each of the concerned states and the European 
Union—resulted in the conclusion of only one cooperation agreement. The ‗Regional Approach‘ 
failed because the states from the region did not accept the European Union‘s initiative to 
assemble them within a single institutional framework ―on a geographical - grouping basis‖ but 
without a commitment to their full integration (Fakiolas and Tzifakis 2008: 381). Therefore the 
results of the ‗Regional Approach‘, which targeted the stabilization of the region as its 
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paramount objective, remained limited. It was only the EU‘s promise of future full integration, 
given after the dramatic crisis in Kosovo in 1999, that appeared to provide the carrot needed. 
Nevertheless, despite the limited success of the ‗Regional Approach‘ and the fact that it 
was primarily directed toward upholding the peace agreements of Dayton and Paris, the concept 
outlined is essential for analysis of the European Union‘s latter policy toward the states of the 
region, since a surprising number of its components remained as blueprints. Most importantly, 
the political construct ‗Western Balkans‘, as outlined in early 1996, remained largely intact as a 
target of the European Union‘s separate regional policy. As its name makes obvious, the 
Stabilization and Association Process launched in 1999 also retained the stabilization of the 
region as one of its main objectives. In subsequent years, the elements of the principle of 
conditionality as envisaged in 1996 and 1997 were frequently cited by the European Union‘s 
Institutions‘ documents as still being relevant. Some features of the policy instruments outlined 
for the first time by the ‗Regional Approach‘ still figure today. Although all of these elements 
have been reshaped since 1999 to fit the new ‗integration prospective‘, more or less following 
the developed patterns of the European Union‘s enlargement law, it seems that many original 
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